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Abstract: 
This paper re-examines the relationship between Treasury borrowing and monetary growth examined 
previously with annual data by Barro, Niskanen and Hamburger and Zwick. Our analysis, based on quarterly 
data, produces evidence of a positive and significant impact of total Treasury borrowing upon the growth of the 
monetary base for the 1954/I-1961/II and 1961/III-1974/IV periods but an insignificant coefficient for the Barro 
expenditure variable. When the coefficient instability during the 1961/III-1980/IV period is corrected by a 
dummy variable technique thy debt coefficient is positive and significant and remains stable for this two decade 
period. 
 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
Recently, Hamburger and Zwick (1981, hereafter HZ) have employed Barro's (1977, 1978a, b) model of money 
supply determination and have shown that both Barro and Niskanen (1978) err in their investigation of the 
budget deficit-money supply relationship by not recognizing two different policy regimes in the postwar period. 
HZ argue that the pre-1961 data used by Barro and Niskanen represent a different policy regime and show that 
budget deficits had a positive and significant effect on money supply growth for the 1961-1974 period but not 
for the 1954-1976 period.
1
 Using coefficient estimates for the 1961-1974 period, HZ's equation overpredicts 
monetary growth for 1975-1976 but accurately predicts monetary growth for 19771978.
2
 From this evidence, 
HZ conclude that the 1975-1976 period represents only a brief deviation from the Keynesian macroeconomic 
regime of 1961-1974 because the predictive accuracy for 1977-1978 reflects a return by the Federal Reserve 
Board to their 'interest rate smoothing policy' and monetization of the debt through open-market operations. 
This conclusion is reinforced by Hamburger and Zwick (1982) where they report evidence of a positive and 
significant coefficient on the budget deficit for the 1961-1981 period in a money supply equation which 
includes a dummy variable for 1975-1976. 
 
This evidence of a significant budget deficit coefficient and their assertion of different policy regimes in the 
post-war period suggests that the residuals employed by Barro as a measure of unanticipated monetary growth 
are obtained from a money supply equation which is misspecified and subject to structural instability.
3
 HZ, 
however, are limited in their ability to test for a change in the deficit to monetary growth relationship prior to 
1961 and after 1974 or to test for the structural stability of their model around these dates because they employ 
annual data. A quarterly version of the Barro (1977, 1978a) money supply model has been published by Barro 
and Rush (1980, hereafter BR) for the 1941/I-1978/I period, but they do not test for the significance of a deficit 
variable or for the structural instability of the equation. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold: ( 1) to 
test for the significance of fiscal variables such as real government expenditures and the real deficit, and (2) to 
test for the structural stability of the coefficient estimates over 1954/I-1980/IV. 
 
In section 2 we introduce and respecify the Barro, BR and HZ money supply models. The substantial growth in 
off-line budget items in the past decade suggests that the total change in the government's debt rather than the 
deficit is the more appropriate variable to test for the total impact of government borrowing upon Federal 
Reserve policy.
4
 Accordingly, we substitute the total change in the debt for the deficit and the monetary base for 
the money supply, because it is the monetary base which is directly affected by the Federal Reserve's purchase 
of government bonds. In section 3 we use quarterly data to test for the stability of the monetary base equations 
in both the early 1960s and 1970s and find that Quandt and Chow tests fail to accept the null hypothesis of 
structural stability. Therefore, we test for coefficient instability in section 4 for the 1961/III-1980/IV period. 
Conclusions appear in section 5. 
 
2. The models 
Barro (1977, 1978a) estimates the following money supply equation with annual data for the 1941-1976 and 
1946-1976 period: 
 
while BR estimate a quarterly version of eq. (1) for 1941/I-1978/I: 
 
where DMt = log(Mt/Mt - 1) and Mt is the average stock of M1 money; UNt - 1 = log [U/(1-U)]t - 1 and U is the 
unemployment rate of the total labor force; FEDV is an exponentially declining distributed lag of the log of real 
federal expenditures; and DEF=[deficit/(Pt • yt* )1)], where Pt is the GNP deflator and yt* is the trend value of 
real GNP.
5
 To maintain a consistent definition between fiscal variables, HZ redefine FEDV to be FED, where 
FED = (Gt/Pt • yt*) and Gt is current federal government expenditures. While HZ estimate eq. (1) and variations 
of this equation for the 1954-1976 period, they estimate only the following equation for the 1961-1974 period to 
conserve degrees of freedom:
6
 
 
We estimate eq. (3) using quarterly data with the DEBT substituted for DEF and with the monetary base 
substituted for the money stock such that: 
 
where DEBT = ∆NFD/(Pt  • yt*), ∆NFD is the change in net federal debt in period t, and DBt = log(Bt/Bt - 1) with 
Bt equal to the quarterly average of the base.
7
 The Barro and Rush money supply model with the DEBT variable 
included also is estimated with either DM or DB as the dependent variable: 
 
The appropriate lag length for the dependent variable in eqs. (4) and (5) is determined by searching over an 
eight period lag for the 1961/III-1974/IV period. In each case the coefficients for six, seven and eight period 
lags are individually and collectively insignificant for both equations.
8 
 
3. The results 
Eq. (4) is first estimated for the 1954/I-1974/IV period and for the appropriate subperiods in order to conduct 
the Quandt likelihood ratio test and the Chow test for a structural shift in the equation between 1959/I-1961/IV. 
The results are presented in table 1 as eqs. (1.1)-(1.3). The breakpoint of 1961/II maximizes the test statistics for 
both the Quandt and Chow tests and results in the rejection of the null hypothesis of structural stability of the 
equation during the 1954/I-1974/IV period. 
9
 The structural instability of the equation is a result of the 
instability of the individual lagged base coefficients whose cumulative sums (t-statistics) for the two subperiods 
are -1.27 (2.35) and 0.66 (5.96) respectively. The debt coefficient is significant and similar in magnitude in both 
periods while the expenditure coefficient is insignificant in both periods. The R
2
 of 0.70 for the 1954/I-1974/IV 
period and the significance of the debt and three lagged base coefficients camouflages the instability of the 
lagged base coefficients across the two subperiods and the poor fit of the equation for the 1954/I-1961/II 
period.
10 
 
Eq. (4) is then estimated for the 1961/III-1980/IV period and for the appropriate subperiods in order to test for a 
structural shift between 1969/I- 1975/IV. These results are presented in table 1 as eqs. (1.4) -(1.6) given the 
breakpoint at 1969/III which maximizes the test statistics for both the Quandt likelihood ratio and the Chow test 
and leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of structural stability over 1961/III-1980/IV.
11
 There is evidence 
of coefficient instability because the debt coefficient is positive and significant for the 1961/III-1969/III period 
while the expenditure coefficient is positive and significant for the 1969/IV-1980/IV period. The lagged base 
coefficients also display instability across the two periods as their sum (t-statistic) declines from 0.67 (3.75) to 
0.34 (2.03). The R 
2
 of 0.51 and the significance of two lagged base coefficients for the 1961/III-1980/IV period 
camouflages the instability of the lagged base, debt, and expenditure coefficients across the two periods and the 
poor fit of the equation for the 1969/IV-1980/IV period. 
 
 
The equation estimates for both the 1961/III-1980/IV and 1954/I-1980/IV periods reveal insignificant debt and 
expenditure coefficients for these longer time intervals. The previously reported results, however, confirm the 
existence of three distinct regimes where the debt coefficient is positive and significant in the first two regimes 
and the expenditure coefficient is positive and significant in the third regime. 
 
We now consider our version of the BR equation with either the money supply (DM) or the monetary base (DB) 
as the dependent variable. The results of estimating eq. (5) given the break points determined for eq. (4) appear 
in table 2. Coefficient instability and insignificance across subperiods is once again apparent. First, the 
expenditure variable (FEDV) is never significant.
12
 Second, the unemployment coefficients e only significant 
for the DM equation estimated for the 1961/III-1969/III period. Third, the debt coefficient is significant for both 
dependent variables for only the 1961/III-1969/III period. A structural shift in eq. (5) at 1969/III is confirmed 
by the Quandt test for both dependent variables and by the Chow test for the DB equation at the five percent 
level of significance.
13
 The Chow and Quandt tests also fail to accept the null hypothesis of structural stability 
at 1961/II for the DB equation at the one percent level, but the two tests fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 
five percent level for the DM equation.
14
 Despite the failure to reject the hypothesis of structural stability for the 
DM equation at 1961/II, a comparison of eq. (2.1) which has no significant coefficients, and eq. (2.2) which has 
five significant coefficients reveals considerable difference in coefficient size and significance. Therefore, there 
is also evidence of three distinct regimes for the Barro and Rush money supply or monetary base equations.
15
 
 
4. Analysis of coefficient instability 
The Quandt and Chow tests are incapable of pinpointing the source of structural instability. Therefore, a dummy 
variable test developed by Gujarati (1970) is employed to test the coefficient instability in eq. (4) by including a 
dummy variable for the intercept, a dummy variable times the debt variable (DDEBT) and a dummy variable 
times the expenditure coefficient (DFED).
 
Three shift periods are tested for the 1961/III -1980/IV period such that DI represents a dummy variable equal 
to zero from 1961/III-1969/III and one thereafter, D2 represents a second dummy variable equal to zero from 
1961/III-1973/IV and one thereafter, and D3 represents a third dummy variable equal to zero from 1961/III-
1976/III and one thereafter. D1 is specified as a result of the structural break in eq. (4). D2 is specified to test 
for any coefficient shift at the beginning of the 1974-1975 recession. D3 is specified on the basis of the HZ 
argument that the debt to monetary growth linkage reappeared in 1977 and 1978. The exact specification of D3 
is determined by searching over the 1975/II to 1977/IV period for the dummy variable which minimizes the 
standard error of the regression in eq. (6): 
 
The results are reported in table 3 for eq. (6) and for an equation which constrains d1 =d2=d3=0 because these 
coefficients are insignificant in the results reported as eq. (3.1).
16
 This evidence confirms shifts for the intercept 
and the expenditure coefficient for each of the three breakpoints. The expenditure coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero for the 1961/III-1969/III period and is close to zero after the third shift because the sum (t-
statistic) of ci equals 0.10 (0.18) and 0.04 (0.45) in eqs. (3.1) and (3.2). The debt coefficient is significant and 
similar in magnitude (0.57 and 0.49) in both equations." The insignificance of the debt shift parameters and the 
significance of the debt coefficient suggests that a positive and significant linkage between the change in the 
stock of government debt and the growth of the monetary base existed during the 1961/III-1980/IV period. 
Furthermore, the significant debt coefficient estimate of 0.53 for the 1954/I-1961/II period provides evidence of 
monetary accommodation of Treasury borrowing by the Federal Reserve Board for the entire post-Accord 
period. 
 
5. Summary 
The positive and significant impact of the real trend value of the change in the stock of government debt upon 
the growth of the monetary base is the most important finding of this paper. Yet, the Barro-type money supply 
and monetary base models which have been the focus of this paper differ from the standard reaction function 
models which may include income, interest rates, the rate of inflation, the grip between actual and potential 
output and a balance-of-payments measure as explanatory variables. 
 
Previous studies using reaction functions usually have not included a debt variable.
18
 Our results of a significant 
debt coefficient are consistent with the evidence reported by Levy (1981) who tests a reaction function derived 
from a structural IS-LM model.
19
 Further, the evidence of structural shifts and coefficient instability in eqs. (4) 
and (5) suggest a fundamental difficulty in obtaining estimates of anticipated versus unanticipated monetary 
growth. Barro (1977,1978a), and Barro and Rush have implicitly assumed structural stability of the money 
supply equation to obtain their unanticipated monetary growth series.
20
 The problem of economic agents 
identifying structural shifts and forming expectations during transition periods of systematic and unsystematic 
components of a variable must be addressed in the future. 
 
Appendix 
Mt = the stock of M1B money. Published in Macroeconomics, 2nd edition, by Robert J. Gordon. Revised 
quarterly data, 1947/I-1980/IV. 
Bt  = the adjusted monetary base. Calculated from a monthly series provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, January 1950--December 1980. 
U = the unemployment rate of the total civilian labor force. Published in Gordon's Macroeconomics, 2nd 
edition, 1947/I-1980/IV. 
FEDV= Barro's exponentially declining distributed lag of the log of real federal expenditures, 1947/I-1978/IV. 
See Barro (1977, 1978a, b), and Barro and Rush (1980). 
Pt = the GNP deflator. Published in Gordon's Macroeconomics, 2
nd
 edition, 1947/I-1980/IV. 
yt* = the trend value of real GNP. Calculated over the 1948/II-1980/IV period as a linear time trend corrected 
for serial correlation. 
Gt  =nominal federal government expenditures (NIPA bass). Published in Business Statistics 1977 and the 
Survey of Current Business, various issues, 1947/I-1980/IV. 
NFD = the stock of net federal debt. Published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Revised quarterly 
data, 1948/I-1980/IV. 
 
Notes: 
1
 Hamburger and Zwick chose 1961 as the breakpoint on the basis of the Buchanan and Wagner (1978) 
argument that macroeconomic pokey underwent a change in the early 1960's. Buchanan and Wagner (pp. 114-
116) label 1961-1976 as the Keynesian period and provide casual evidence in a table that the 1961-19
.
4 period 
reinforces the thesis that budget deficits are positively related to changes in the stock of money'. 
2 
HZ report predicted values of monetary growth of 8.0%, 7.7%, 7.4% and 8.2% for 1975-1978 while actual 
rates were 4.4%, 5.3%, 7.3% and 7.8%. Therefore, their simulation errors were -3.6% and -2.4% for 1975-1976 
and -0.1% and -0.4% for 1977 and 1978.
 
3 
The work by Barro, and Barro and Rush (1980) came under initial criticism by Small (1979) and by Blinder 
(1980), Gordon (1980) and Weintraub (1980) in their response to the Barro and Rush paper which was 
presented at a 1978 NBE R conference. Other responses to Barro's work are cited by Mishkin (1982).
 
4
 HZ did note that a variable defined as the funds raised in the credit market by the U.S. government in the Flow 
of Funds Account strengthened their results (see p. 146, fn. 5). While the deficit has averaged $38.2 billion from 
1977-1980, the total change in the debt which includes the deficit and off-line budget items has averaged $54.8 
billion in the same period. 
5
 See Barro (1977, p 103 and 1978b, p. 577), and Barro and Rush (1980, p. 33) for more 
information about the data. 
6
 HZ also estimate eq. (3) with either b2 or b3 constrained to zero. The Barro unemployment rate variable lagged 
one period was not included because it was insignificant. 
7
 See the appendix for the definitions and sources of the raw data. 
8 
Eqs. (4) and (5) which include an eight-period quarterly lag on DB are also estimated for each of the 
regressions reported in tables 1 and 2. The individual coefficients for c0, c1, and c? are never positive and 
significant. 
9 
The calculated χ
2
 statistic for the likelihood ratio test is 33.68 with a critical value of 23.2 at the one percent 
level of significance, The calculated F-statistic for the Chow test is F„,,m —4,05 with a critical value of 2.80 at 
the one percent level, 
10 
The results of estimating eqs. (1.1)-(1.3) with either d1 or d3 constrained to zero results in significant d1 
coefficients of 0.13, 0.14 and 0.15 and significant d2 coefficients of 0.58, 0.66, and 0.54. The results of 
estimating eq. (4) with DM substituted for DB reveal R
2 
values of -0.11, 0.44 and 0.51 for eq. (1.1)-(1.3). There 
are no positive and significant coefficients in eq. (1.1) whereas c1, c2, and d2 are positive and significant in eq. 
(1.2) and  c1, c2, and d1  are positive and significant in eq (1.3). Results are available from the authors as 
appendices A and B. 
11 
The calculated χ
2
 statistic for the likelihood ratio test is 24.96 with a critical value of 23.2 at the one percent 
level of significance. The calculated F-statistic for the Chow test is F?,? = 2.89with a critical value of 2.82 at the 
one percent level. 
12
 The results of estimating eq. (5) with y2 constrained to zero shows an insignificant FEDV coefficient in every 
equation reported in table 2. R
2
 values for the eight equations are —0.11, 0.32, 0.51, 0.10, 0.20, 0.15, 0.43 and 
0.47 respectively. Results are available from the authors as appendix C. 
13
 For the 1969/III-1969/IV breakpoint the calculated F-statistic for the Chow test is 2.02 for the DB and 1.88 
for the DM equation where the critical value for F11,48 is 2.00 at the five percent level. The calculated X
2
 statistic 
for the Quandt test is 26.84 for the DB and 26.32 for the DM equation where the critical values are 22.36 and 
27.69 for the five and one percent levels of significance. 
14
 For the 1961/II-1961/III breakpoint the calculated F-statistic is 3.92 for the DB and 1.11 for the DM equation 
where the critical values for F11,62 are 1.95 and 2.56 for the five and one percent levels of significance. The 
calculated χ
2
 statistic is 44.34 for the DB and 19.06 for the DM equation where the critical values are 22.36 and 
27.69 for the five and one percent levels of significance. 
15
 The structural instability of these equations may be a result of the variations in central bank behavior resulting 
from the change in administrations in 1961 and 1969 and in the Federal Reserve Board Chairman in 1970, or 
from the change in the response by the Federal Reserve to certain economic variables. The exact reason the 
structural shifts of the equations lies beyond the scope of this paper, though the next section tests for the 
stability of each coefficient estimate. 
16
 An anonymous referee suggested that we test for the output effect of unanticipated monetary growth with the 
residuals obtained' from eqs. (3.1) and (3.2). The following output equation, which is similar to the one reported 
by BR in their Table 2.1, is estimated for 1961/III-1980/1V 
 
where yt is real GNP, e1 are the residuals obtained from either eq. (3.1) or (3.2) estimated for 1961/III-1980/IV, 
T is a time trend and G/P is real government expenditures. Regardless of whether the residuals of eqs. (3.1) or 
(3.2) are obtained from either the monetary base version (reported in table 3) or the money supply version (not 
reported), the current and at least the first three lagged residuals are positive and significant for eq. (16.1) and 
the   2 = 0.99. The   2 of the money supply versions of eqs. (3.1) and (3.2), however, are only 0.30 and 0.32. 
Furthermore, the residuals (unanticipated monetary growth) are more highly correlated with the growth rate of 
the actual money supply (0.75) than is anticipated monetary growth (0.66). The high correlations between 
unanticipated and actual monetary growth must call into questions the interpretation of significant 'residuals' in 
output equations like (16.1). 
17
 Eq. (6) is also employed to test separately for shifts in the lagged base coefficients for each of the three 
breakpoints. The shift coefficients are insignificant except for DBt - 2 times the D1 dummy shift variable and for 
DBt - 1 times the D2 dummy shift variable. When these two shift variables are included in eq. (6), their 
coefficients are insignificant and the results are similar to those reported in table 3. 
18
 Of the twelve reaction function studies summaried by Barth, Sickles and Wiest 11982) only Froyen (1974) 
includes a debt variable. 
19
 Levy's reaction function includes income, inflationary expectations, the unemployment rate, the interest rate 
and a debt measure which is the outstanding publicly-held debt (not seasonally adjusted). Levy's debt variable is 
not deflated by either a price index or a trend value of real GNP. If the change in nominal debt or the change in 
real debt is substituted in eq. (4) for the DEBT variable, the significance of the debt coefficient is maintained for 
the results reported in table 1. These results are available from the authors as appendices D and E. 
20 
Froyen (1979) uses quarterly data and tests a monetary equation for three separate periods to obtain 
anticipated and unanticipated money supply data. His study provides empirical evidence that real output is 
affected by anticipated monetary growth in the short run.
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